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IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
THROUGH EGG DONATION: 
A PROSPECTIVE VIEW OF 
LEGAL ISSUES 
JAMES M. TREPPA* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that 10-20% of the couples desiring to have 
children are unable to do so because of infertility. 1 For these 
couples, the opportunity to bear children is now available 
through the use of numerous noncoita12 reproductive tech-
niques. These "new" techniques, designed as an alternative to 
infertility, include in vitro fertilization (IVF),S artificial insem-
ination: and surrogacy.6 Although adoption is still a viable 
alternative, it has become less available due to a decrease in 
"adoptable" babies relative to demand.s In addition, many 
couples desire to produce a child that is genetically related to 
at least one parent, and many women desire to go through the 
experience of bearing and raising a child whether or not that 
child is genetically related to them. 
As reproductive techniques continue to advance, many 
legal and ethical questions surrounding the use of some of 
these techniques remain unanswered. One such technique is 
IVF through the use of egg/oocyte7 donation. The lack oflegal 
or statutory parameters regarding the use of IVF egg donation 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
1. Giesen, International Medical Malpractice Law, 628 (1988). 
2. "Coitus" means sexual intercourse; a sexual union between male and female. 
STEDMAN'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY 151 (1987). 
3. "In vitro" is defined as an artificial environment ... as in a test tube or culture 
media. Id. at 384. 
4. "Artificial insemination" is the introduction of semen of the husband or of 
another into the vagina other than through the act of coitus. Id. at 379. 
5. A "surrogate" is a person who functions in another's life as a substitute for some 
third person. ld. at 719. 
6. American Fertility Society, Ethics Committee: Ethical Considerations of the 
New Reproductive Technologies, 46 Fert. and Steril. 37s (Supp. I, 1986). 
7. Trouson & Wood, Extra Corporeal Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, Clinics 
in Obstetrics and Gynecology, Dec. 1981 at 1. An oocyte is an egg, or ovum, that is 
removed directly from the ovary. It is mature oocytes that are transfered from ovar-
ian follicles and matured in vitro. 
777 
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is a direct consequence of judicial and legislative failure to pro-
mulgate guidelines regarding noncoital reproduction. As 
many judges continue to point to legislators for guidance, 
proposed bills stagnate at the hearing stage.8 
This article focuses on a specific hypothetical that has yet 
to be litigated in California or in any other state or federal court 
in the United States. Imagine a situation in which a married 
couple9 wishes to bear a child but discovers that the woman is 
infertile. The woman expresses a desire to gestate10 the off-
spring herself, so the couple decides to undergo IVF by use of 
egg donation. At this point they have two alternatives. First, 
the couple could go to a clinic that provides donated eggs, and 
pay for the use of these eggs in the fertilization process. 
Alternatively the couple could find a woman with whom they 
have some relationship, and contract with her to donate eggs 
in the fertilization process. Many couples are using the eggs 
of sisters, cousins, or close friends because they are more 
aware of the biological attributes and medical history of the 
donating woman. 
In the first scenario, a subsequent custody battle over the 
child is not likely for the same reasons a subsequent lawsuit 
involving a "stranger" donating sperm is not likely to occur. 
When an anonymous donor is involved, there are a large num-
ber of potential biological offspring that may be involved. In 
this situation the donor may not feel compelled to sue for cus-
tody of any of the resulting children, even if she later discov-
ers that she has become infertile. In the second alternative it 
is easy to see why a subsequent lawsuit for custody of the 
child may result. Assume the donee couple has undergone suc-
cessful IVF with donated eggs of the relative or friend. The 
donor then decides she wants to have her own child, but 
8. In California, the legislators adopted part of the Unifonn Parentage Act in Civil 
Code Sections 7000-7021 in 1975, but no new legislation in regards to techniques such 
as egg donation has been enacted since that time. 
9. Although this article will focus on the legal rights of married couples desiring 
to use egg donation, it is my view that these rights should be shared by unmarried and 
same·sex couples as well. The reason for this limited focus is simply that historical· 
Iy, courts have not been willing to take such a big step in granting equal rights. If these 
rights can be granted to a married couple initially, the same rights should logically 
follow to other groups of infertile women through constitutional protections. For a dis· 
cussion of whether IVF should be restricted to married couples see Annas & Elias, NF 
and Embryo Transfer: Mediolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 
Fam. L. Q. 211 (1983). 
10. "Gestation" refers to pregnancy in viviparous animals. STEDMAN'S POCK· 
ET MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 307. 
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dfscovers she has become infertile. Here, the donor is much 
more likely to sue for her biological offspring. How should a 
California court decide? 
In either situation, and without legislative guidance express-
ly directed at egg donation, the court must make a number of dif-
ficult decisions on a number of issues. First, since one woman 
is the donor/genetic mother and the other is the recipient/ges-
tational mother, the court must decide who is the "natural" 
mother of the child. Second, the court must decide whether or 
not the donor/genetic mother may terminate her parental rights 
in the offspring through contractual agreement. Lastly, the 
court must decide whether or not custody should be granted to 
the donor/genetic mother, or to the recipient couple that includes 
the gestational mother and genetic father. 
This article attempts to predict the outcome of these deci-
sions as they specifically relate to IVF by use of egg donation. 
My initial prospective conclusion, based on case law already lit-
igated in the areas of surrogate mothering, 11 artificial ins em-
ination,12 gestational surrogacy,IS and the best interests of the 
child, is that a California court would find the recipient/ges-
tational mother to be the "natural" mother. In addition, the 
court would uphold the contract if the donor/genetic mother 
gave her informed consent to terminate any parental rights she 
might have to the child. Finally, the court would grant custody 
to the recipient couple, taking into account not only the bio-
logical and gestational tie the child has with the couple, but also 
the IVF contract and most importantly the best interests of the 
child. 
This article will take you through the analytical process I 
followed in reaching my conclusion. First, for those unfamil-
iar with in vitro fertilization, it is important to understand the 
medical procedure and the role each individual has in the 
birth of the IVF child. This explanation is followed by a dis-
cussion of four areas of law that the court will most likely 
consider when analyzing the legal issues surrounding IVF 
egg donation: surrogacy, artificial insemination, gestational 
surrogacy, and the "best interests of the offspring." Finally, this 
11. Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Adoption of Matthew B., 232 
Cal. App. 3d 1239 (1991). 
12. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986). 
13. Anna J. v. Mark C., 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12433 (1991). It should be 
noted that this case is currently under review by the California Supreme Court. 
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author argues that until the court decides otherwise, all rear-
ing and custodial rights should be placed with the recipient cou-
ple. Moreover, new legislation, rather than judicial directives, 
should be the first step in avoiding ugly court battles in the 
future. 
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE OF IVF 
A. Female Infertility14 
Infertility in women may be caused by lack of ovarian 
function due to gonadal dysgenesis,I5 an insensitive ovary, or 
autoimmunity.16 Ovarian function may also be absent due to 
premature menopause,!7 surgically absent ovaries, chemother-
apy or other radiotherapy-induced ovarian failure. IS Women 
with normal ovarian function may be infertile because of 
blocked fallopian tubes or abnormal oocytes. 19 IVF, described 
in more detail below, gives these women the chance to become 
pregnant and carry a child to term, whereas without the use 
of this technique it would be physically and biologically impos-
sible for them to do so. 
B. IVF Procedure 
Egg donation can be used by couples to achieve parenthood 
when the woman is infertile. IVF through egg donation gen-
erally involves two initial steps: 1) the donor's ovaries are 
hyperstimulated by fertility hormone drugs to produce sever-
al mature eggs for ovulation;20 and 2) egg retrieval is performed 
14. "Infertility" is defined as, "relative sterility; diminished or absent fertility; 
in the female it indicates adequate anatomical structures and equivocal function, with 
the possibility of pregnancy that mayor may not proceed to term." STEDMAN'S POCK-
ET MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 375. 
15. "Gonadal dysgenesis" refers to defective development of the gonads (repro-
ductive glands that include the ovaries and testes). Id. at 226 .. 
16. In immunology, "autoimmunity" is a condition in which one's own tis-
sues are subject to deleterious (harmful) effects of the immunological system. Id. 
at 78. 
17. "Menopause" is the permanent cessation of the menses or menstral flow. Id. 
at 446. 
18. Rosenwaks, Donor Eggs: Their Application in Modern Reproductive 
Technology, 47 Fert. and Steril. 895, 897-98 (1987). 
19. Id. 
20. "Ovulation" is the release of an ovum from the ovarian follicle. STED-
MAN'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 542. 
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surgically either by laparoscopy21 or through transvaginal 
ultrasonographic22 methods.23 
An average of ten eggs24 are then placed in a petri dish with 
the male's sperm to effect fertilization. If fertilization occurs, 
the resulting conceptus25 is transferred to another dish.28 Mter 
the eggs have divided twice (the "four-cell stage"), the physi-
cian transfers approximately five blastocysts through the 
cervix to the uterus of the recipient/gestational mother. If the 
transfer is successful, the blastocyst will attach to the uterine 
wall as if natural conception had occurred.27 
C.. Cryopreservation 
In vitro fertilized eggs that are not transferred to the uter-
ine cavity may be frozen by use of a procedure called "cryop-
reservation. "28 There are many medical advantages in pre-
serving and later using the extra-embryos: an 8-12% increase 
in IVF pregnancies; physical, psychological and financial cost 
reduction of IVF treatment; and an embryo selection increase 
by recipient couples for transfer on genetic grounds.29 Although 
21. This is one form of peritoneoscopy that examines the contents of the peri-
toneum (the smooth transparent serous membrane that lines the cavity of the 
abdomen) with a peritoneoscope passed through the abdominal wall. 1d. at 782. 
22. An "ultasonography" locates, measures or delinates deep structures by mea-
suring the reflection or transmission of high frequency or ultrasonic waves. Id. at 782. 
23. The growing trend is to retrieve the eggs through transvaginal ultrasound, 
where the physician can guide a catheter through a small scope to gather the eggs. 
Sauer, Paulson, and Lobo, A Preliminary Report On Oocyte Donation Extending 
Reproductive Potential To Women Over 40.323:17 New Eng. J. Med. 1157 (1991); here-
inafter Sauer. Paulson, and Lobo. A Preliminary Report On Oocyte Donation. This is 
a popular method because it does not require the use of anesthesia and therefore may 
encourage more women to become donors. Garcia. Reproductive Technology For 
Procreation, Experimentation, and Profit, 11 J. Leg. Med. 1, 14 (1990). 
24. Sauer, Paulson, and Lobo, A Preliminary Report On Oocyte Donation, supra 
note 23. at 1158. 
25. The term "conceptus" is used to refer to the product of conception; here it refers 
to the product of any union of human sperm and human ova, occuring in vitro. STED-
MAN'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 157. 
26. At this point, the fertilized eggs undergo a number of cell divisions forming 
a blastodermic vessicle, called the blastocyst. consisting of the inner cell mass and a 
thin trophoblast layer. Id. at 92. 
27. Throughout the first trimester, the recipient female will undergo estrogen and 
progesterone replacement in order to maintain the pregnancy. Sauer. Paulson, and 
Lobo, A Preliminary Report On Oocyte Donation, supra note 23 at 1157-58. 
28. Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos and Control of NF Technology, 
28 Jurimetrics J. 285,287 (Spring 1988); hereinafter Robertson, Decisional Authority 
Over Embryos. The eggs are frozen so that they may be used in further egg and embryo 
donation and gestational surrogacy. 
29.1d. 
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these interests are arguably compelling to the medical pro-
fession, cryopreservation raises many legal issues. 
The first issue raised by cryopreservation involves the right 
to terminate the frozen, pre-implantation embryos. Because the 
United States Supreme Court believes that fetuses are not 
"persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment30 
and therefore not entitled to Due Process or Equal Protection 
guarantees, it is hard to imagine how a fertilized embryo would 
be allowed these constitutional guarantees. However, some pro-
tection may be afforded to a frozen embryo because the 
donor/genetic mother, who is not carrying the embryo, may 
not be able to raise the claim of "health of the mother. "31 
A second issue involves custody of the frozen fertilized 
eggs during separation or divorce of the recipient couple. Who 
should have the rights to, and the rearing duties of the IVF off-
spring?32 These issues, while better addressed in an article sole-
ly dedicated to their analysis,33 deserve to be stated here 
because of their potential importance in the framing of legal 
rights surrounding egg donation. 
With a basic understanding of IVF medical procedure, let 
us consider the hypothetical couple who goes through IVF egg 
donation and is subsequently sued by the egg donor. Because 
the outcome of this litigation depends entirely on analogy, a 
California court would most likely consider the reasoning of 
previously litigated "reproductive" cases in order to render 
its decision. I will next analyze four areas of "reproductive" 
cases in an attempt to provide a prospective view of the court's 
final determination. 
III. SURROGATE MOTHERING CASES 
Surrogate mothering raises questions beyond those relat-
ed to IVF egg donation, because only two people are involved 
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
31. The Court states in Roe that it is, areasonable and appropriate for a State to 
decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that 
of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no 
longer sole and any right she possesses must be measured accordingly." Id. 
32. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), 1989 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 641. The court in Davis held that seven cryogenically frozen 
embryos produced by in vitro fertilization of woman's ova with her estranged husband's 
sperm are human life whose best interests require that they be made available, 
despite the husband's objection, for implantation in the woman to give them the 
opportunity to be born ' 
33. See Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos, supra note 28. 
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in the "reproduction" of the child. In a "pure surrogacy" situ-
ation, a woman contracts with a couple to carry a child to 
term for them. The surrogate is artificially inseminated with 
the male's sperm and becomes pregnant. She then carries 
the offspring through gestation and birth, whereby she gives 
the child over to the recipient couple per the terms of the con-
tract. The only two individuals directly involved in the creation 
and birth of the child are the surrogate and the man whose 
semen is used to impregnate the surrogate. 
Remember, in IVF egg donation, the donor/genetic mother 
provides the egg that is fertilized with the male's sperm. Then 
a third person, the recipient/gestational mother, is implanted 
with the fertilized embryo. In IVF egg donation, three indi-
viduals are directly involved in the creation and birth of the 
child. This distinction may be important when considering the 
persuasiveness of "pure surrogacy" cases when applied to the 
IVF custody battle. 
A. Matter of Baby M. 
The leading case regarding "pure surrogacy" is the landmark 
decision Matter of Baby M.34 In 1985, William Stern and Mary 
Beth Whitehead entered into a surrogacy agreement whereby 
Mrs. Whitehead would provide gestational services to the Sterns 
in exchange for $10,000.36 After giving birth, Mrs. Whitehead 
realized that she could not part with the child. She felt a bond 
with the child that developed during her pregnancy.38 A custody 
battle ensued, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the 
matter. In a unanimous decision, the court concluded that the 
surrogacy contract was invalid, because it conflicted with both 
existing statutes and public policies of the State.37 The court stat-
ed that a contractual agreement to abandon one's parental 
rights would not be enforced.3s Although the court ultimately 
gave sole custody of the child to the Sterns under the "best 
interests of the offspring" argument,39 it refused to terminate 
Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights. 
34. 537 A.2d. 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
35. [d. at 1234. 
36. [d. at 1236. 
37. [d. at 1240. 
38. [d. at 1243. 
39. The court based this conclusion on the instability of the Whitehead family and 
the financial difficulties they had incurred. For instance, Mrs. Whitehead's sister was 
in the process of foreclosing on her second mortgage; Mr. Whitehead's employment was 
always at risk because of his alcoholism; and Mrs. Whitehead had not worked for some 
time. [d. at 1258. 
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Throughout its opinion the court focused on the fact that 
Mrs. Whitehead was the "natural mother," and stated that 
the father's paternal right was no greater than the mother's.40 
By stating that Mrs. Whitehead was the child's "natural 
mother," the court seemed to give great weight to the fact 
that Mrs. Whitehead was both the biological mother and the 
gestational mother, who had undergone an emotional bond 
with the offspring prior to its birth. Despite acknowledging 
Mrs. Whitehead as the "natural mother," the court held that the 
interest of the natural father and adoptive mother is the pre-
dominant interest to be taken into consideration.41 
B. California Surrogacy Cases 
In a recent California case dealing with "pure surrogacy," 
the California Court of Appeals came down with the same 
result as the Baby M. case, but under different reasoning. 
On July 31, 1991 the California Court of Appeals decided the 
Adoption of Matthew B.,42 and denied the surrogate's petition 
to withdraw her consent to give up parental rights based on the 
legality of the contract. The court stated that the parties had 
assumed the risk of illegality when entering into the con-
tract43 and that the best interests of the child favored leaving 
him with his natural father and adoptive mother.44 
Using these "pure surrogacy" cases as persuasive author-
ity in deciding our IVF hypothetical, a California court would 
probably grant custody of the child to the recipient couple for 
the following reasons. First, the donor/genetic mother, citing 
to Baby M.,46 would argue that contracting away one's parental 
rights is invalid, and therefore, as the "natural mother" she 
should retain custody of the child. Yet the term "natural 
mother" as used in Baby M., is misleading in the context of IVF 
through egg donation. In IVF, the donor/genetic mother is only 
40. [d. at 1247. 
41. [d. at 1248. 
42. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1239. 
43. [d. at 1256. 
44. The court stated, "[olur conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
direction that courts should not construe adoption consent requirements in favor of 
the rights of the natural parent, but should liberally construe them so as to further 
the main purpose of the adoption statutes: promoting .. .'the welfare of children, 
bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real parents, by the legal recognition 
and regulation of the consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of the rela-
tionship of parent and child.'" [d. at 1257. 
45. 537 A.2d at 1227. 
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the biological donor; she does not carry the offspring nor does 
she give birth to it. It is the recipient/gestational mother who 
undergoes the nine-months of pregnancy and feels the emo-
tional "bond" with the child which the surrogate experienced 
in Baby M. The recipient/gestational mother has an equal, and 
perhaps greater argument that she is the "natural mother" of 
the offspring, even if she is not biologically related. 
Second, a California court may use the reasoning of 
Matthew B.,46 and simply uphold the contract. Assuming the 
donor/genetic mother gives informed consent to use her donat-
ed eggs in the recipient's IVF treatment, and she is fully com-
pensated according to the terms of the contract, the court 
would find full performance of the contract. In doing so, the 
court would uphold the contract in favor of the recipient cou-
ple, even if the contract is deemed illegalY 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court may look 
to the "best interests of the offspring" to grant custody to the 
recipient couple. Although the donor may argue that Baby M. 
dealt with an unstable family in the Whitehead's,48 this is prob-
ably not enough to overcome the language in Matthew B.49 
The court stated that the adoption statutes should be con-
strued liberally by recognizing that the closest counterpart to 
the relationship of parent and child weighs heavily in favor of 
the recipient couple. The recipient couple has psychological-
ly and economically planned for the birth and care of the child 
from the beginning. They have undergone the nine months of 
pregnancy together, with the recipient female actually giving 
birth to the child. These factors would favor their claim over 
the claim of the donor/genetic mother as the closest counter-
part to the relationship of parent and child. 
However, this is only one consideration by the court. It is 
important to keep in mind that IVF through egg donation 
46. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1239. 
47. The court in Matthew B., quoting Denning v. Taber, states that, "courts 
will not intercede where the parties have fully performed under the illegal contract. 
This rule 'is intended to preserve the dignity of the law by refusing to determine con-
troversies dependent upon the construction of illegal contracts.'" Id. at 1256. 
48. See supra note 39. 
49. California Civil Code Section 226(a) sets forth a number offactors for the court 
to consider in determining the child's best interests. It directs that consideration of the 
best interests shall include: an assessment of the child's age, the extent of bonding with 
the prospective adoptive parent or parents, the extent of bonding or the potential to bond 
with the natural parent or parents, and the ability of the natural parent or parents to 
provide adequate and proper care and guidance to the child. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1263. 
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involves three people, while surrogacy involves only two. 
Consequently, the outcome of the "pure surrogacy" cases is per-
suasive but not controlling. Thus, a court faced with an IVF 
egg donation custody battle would have to look beyond surro-
gacy case law and focus on decisions involving other repro-
ductive techniques for further guidance. 
IV. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION CASES 
In 1986, the California Court of Appeals decided Jhordan 
C. v. Mary K.50 This case involved a child conceived by artifi-
cial insemination with semen donated personally to Mary 
from Jhordan.51 The court held that where the parties have 
failed to take advantage of the statutory basis for preclusion 
of paternity, 52 the donor of semen can be determined to be the 
father of the child in a paternity action.53 The court awarded 
sole legal and physical custody to the mother, but granted the 
male donor substantial visitation rights. 
In its conclusion, the court stressed that public policy in the 
area of non-traditional notions of family structure is best 
determined by the legislative branch.54 Yet the court seems to 
be affecting public policy by ignoring the "best interests of 
the offspring" argument55 that protects the social and financial 
well-being of the child produced. The court's failure to address 
this issue may lie in the fact that Mary was to raise the child 
jointly with her same-sex partner Victoria. By ignoring the 
"best interests of the offspring" argument, the court avoids a 
discussibn of non-traditional family structures for the sole 
purpose of keeping a male figure in the child's life. As a 
result, the court's reasoning should be used very cautiously and 
50. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986). 
51. Id. at 389. 
52. This statutory preclusion is found in California Civil Code Section 7005, that 
provides in pertinent part, "[i]f, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with 
the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by 
another man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as ifhe were the natu-
ral father of a child thereby conceived .... The donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is 
treated in law as ifhe were not the natural father ofthe child thereby conceived." CAL. 
CIY. CODE 7005 (West 1988). 
53. 179 Cal. App. 3d at 389. 
54. The court states that this decision does not express any, "judicial preference 
toward traditional notions of family structure or toward providing a father where a 
single woman has chosen to bear a child." Id. at 397. 
55. There was nothing in the record of this case showing that Mary was unfit to 
raise the child herself, as the agreement between Jhordan and herself called for. 
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may not be a good basis for determining the outcome of the IVF 
hypothetical. 
Nonetheless, both the recipient couple and the donor in our 
hypothetical IVF lawsuit can use Jhordan to further their 
positions. The egg donor can point toward the court's unwill-
ingness to uphold the contract, and place the child with its bio-
logical mother. The donor may even be able to borrow from the 
language of California Civil Code Section 700566 in an attempt 
to exclude the recipient husband as a sperm donor. 
On the other hand, the recipient couple has two compelling 
arguments to support its position. First, the couple can argue 
that the court's unwillingness to uphold the contract was 
based on the need to keep a male figure present in the child's 
life. In so doing, the recipient couple focuses the court on the 
best interests of the child. Second, the couple can also point 
to California Civil Code Section 7005 and argue that, although 
its language expressly deals with artificial insemination rights, 
it should analogously apply to egg donation cases in order to 
keep up with new reproductive techniques. They can point out 
that section 7005 was designed to take away the legal parental 
rights of the donor,67 and that this should apply equally to 
female donors as well as male donors. Using the artificial 
insemination cases cautiously in deciding our IVF hypothet-
ical, a California court would probably find for the recipient 
couple because of the similarity between an egg donor and a 
sperm donor. Because of this similarity, the argument to ter-
minate the donor's parental rights under section 7005 seems 
to be the strongest argument. 
V. GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CASES 
Gestational surrogacy differs from "pure surrogacy" in 
that the surrogate is not the biological mother of the child. A 
woman who cannot carry a child to term will contract with a 
surrogate for gestational services. This differs from IVF egg 
donation in that the gestational surrogate is the one who has 
the fertilized embryo implanted into her uterine cavity and she 
carries the child through the gestational process. 
The California Court of Appeals recently decided Anna J. 
v. Mark C.,68 a case that could affect the continuation of 
56. See supra note 52. 
57. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 12436. 
58. [d. at 12433. 
11
Treppa: In Vitro Fertilization
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
788 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:777 
noncoital reproductive agreements. Mark and his wife Crispina 
contracted to have a biological child delivered to them by 
Anna, who would receive $10,000 for carrying the child to 
term. &9 When the child was born, Anna, like Mary Beth 
Whitehead in Baby M., decided that she could not give the child 
to Mark and Crispina. &0 The trial court found in favor of Mark 
and Crispina, ruling that they were the "genetic, biological and 
natural" father and mother. It also ruled that the contract was 
legal and enforceable against Anna's claims.61 
Because the trial court found the contract valid, it would 
appear that the Court of Appeals would uphold this decision on 
a contractual basis. But the court went one step further, hold-
ing that, "[I]f a blood test shows a woman is not the natural 
mother of the child, the case must be decided accordingly;"62 
granting no parental rights to the surrogate. The court felt that 
the genetic ties between the donor and the offspring were the 
deciding factor. In so doing, the court did not accept the ges-
tational mother's claim of maternity under California Civil 
Code Section 7003.63 The court found the statute silent on 
whether a birth mother is automatically the "natural mother," 
particularly when her maternity is ruled out by blood tests.64 
While holding that genetics controls, the court's analysis 
tracks the reasoning of the artificial insemination cases. 
The court stated that sperm donors, even though genetically 
tied to the child, would have no rights to custody.66 If the 
court wanted to protect the interests of Mark and Crispina so 
as not to, "deprive them of the traditional parental relationship 
which they might otherwise enjoy,"66 it could have simply 
upheld the trial court's ruling on a contractual basis. 
59. [d. at 12434. 
60. [d. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 12433. 
63. California Civil Code Section 7003 provides in pertinent part, "[tlhe parent 
and child relationship may be established as follows: (1) Between a child and the nat-
ural mother it may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child." [d. 
at 12435. 
64. [d. at 12436. 
65. The court, addressing California Civil Code Section 7005 states, "[slection 7005 
seeks not to punish sperm donors, but to protect both sperm donors and married cou-
ples who employ artificial insemination. If being a sperm donor carried with it the 
responsibilities of parenthood, the pool of volunteers would be small indeed. And by 
the same token, if employing artificial insemination brought with it potential claims 
from sperm donors, few couples would use the procedure." [d. 
66. [d. at 12437. 
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How would this same court decide our hypothetical case 
involving an egg donor and the recipient couple? If Anna J. is 
read literally, the egg donor/genetic mother of the offspring, 
would at the very least obtain partial custody. 
The recipient couple can argue in support of the court's 
position that genetics should only control in gestational sur-
rogacy cases. First, the holding should not apply to IVF 
through egg donation for the same reasons the court conclud-
ed it should not apply to cases of sperm donation.87 If the 
court supports promoting and protecting the rights of couples 
using forms of reproduction involving sperm donors, the same 
protection should apply to the rights of couples contracting with 
egg donors. Second, the contract in Anna J. was upheld, thus 
the court must enforce the contract in an egg donation scenario 
as well in order to give the parties what they freely bargained 
for. Third, public policy should favor the recipient couple in 
order to protect the best interests of the child. 
Based on the holding in Anna J. that genetics controls 
parental rights, a California court deciding the hypothetical 
IVF egg donation case would probably have to grant joint cus-
tody to the donor and the husband whose semen was used in 
creating the child. This decision however, would ignore con-
siderations of the contract and the best interests of the child. 
VI. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE OFFSPRING 
When parenthood is separated along genetic, gestational, 
and social lines, the arguments seem to address the adults 
involved and what rights they have. This focus ignores what 
should be the strongest interest served, namely, the protection 
of the child. At the heart of the "best interests of the off-
spring" argument is stability and continuity for the child.88 The 
fear seems to be that children will be confused by the delina-
tion of genetic, gestational and rearing parents. With IVF egg 
donation, the child will have agenetic link with the rearing 
father and a biological link with the donor/genetic mother. 
But it is the recipient/gestational mother who has the strongest 
link. The recipient female, while pregnant, shares most of her 
major bodily functions with the child. For some time after 
birth, the child retains and uses the woman's life-preserving 
67. See supra note 65. 
68. In Re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d. 725, 730-31 (1979). 
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tissue, cells, blood, nutrients, and anti-bodies. 69 Only the lack 
of a genetic tie between the gestational, rearing mother and the 
offspring distinguishes noncoital reproduction with donor eggs 
from children who are coitally conceived.70 
Where then, is the child better situated to live? Is it with 
it's biological mother? Or is it with it's genetic father and 
gestational mother? The answer is difficult because custody 
of a child born by way of IVF egg donation has yet to be liti-
gated. In looking at the surrogacy and gestational surrogacy 
cases for guidance, it seems clear that the "best interests of the 
offspring" argument is simply a judicial tool without clear 
parameters, which finds a way to give custody to the married 
couple. Whether or not this enhances stability for the child is 
arguable, but granting sole custody to the recipient couple 
would protect reproductive choice and keep these children out 
of ugly court battles-a factor that should be given great con-
sideration. 
In determining the "best interests of the offspring," a court 
must make an, "assessment of the emotional bonds between 
parent and child, upon an inquiry into the heart of the parent-
child relationship the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guid-
ance the parent gives to the child throughout his formative 
years, and often beyond. "71 In our IVF egg donation hypo-
thetical, the donor can only argue that she is the genetic moth-
er and is bonded with the child biologically. Conversely, the 
recipient couple can point to many factors to establish their 
emotional bond with the offspring. First, and most importantly 
is that the recipient/gestational mother has carried the child 
to term and has bonded emotionally and physically with the 
child for that nine-month period. Second, the male is the 
genetic father, and together with the gestational mother the 
recipient couple may begin to raise the child, while the donor 
may not have even seen the child prior to the lawsuit. If a 
meaningful and healthy attachment had formed, then dis-
rupting this bond may cause the child to, "become fragment-
ed, depressed, and insecure in his attachments .... »72 If stability, 
69. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 12436. 
70. Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Human Egg Donation, 52 Fert. and 
Steril. 353, 355 (Sept. 1989). 
71. In Matthew B., the court found both parties capable of providing for Matthew's 
health, safety, and welfare, and no difference in terms of the opportunities for edu-
cation. The court then stated that they must inquire into the parties' bonding to 
Matthew and their fitness as parents. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1264. 
72. ld. at 1265. 
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continuity, and a loving relationship are the most important cri-
teria for determining the "best interests of the child,"73 the court 
would grant custody to the recipient couple in order to protect 
these interests. 
V. WHAT TOMORROW MAY LOOK LIKE FOR THE EGG 
DONATION RECIPIENT COUPLE 
A couple employing IVF by way of egg donation in order to 
conceive a child they could not otherwise conceive, may face a 
situation they never dreamed of: the egg donor comes back into 
their lives after the birth of the child and sues for custody. As 
stated earlier, there has yet to be a case litigated involving IVF 
egg donation, therefore, the recipient couple must look to 
other areas of the law to support their claim and retain cus-
tody of the child. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
One place for the recipient couple to start is by showing 
they have a constitutionally protected right of access to the 
reproductive technique of IVF by egg donation, and therefore, 
interference with this access would be a constitutional viola-
tion. Although nowhere in the United States Constitution 
are individuals expressly granted the right ofprivacy,74 there 
are implied protections regarding the right to procreate,76 the 
right to privacy within marriage, and the right of access to con-
traceptives. 
The United States Supreme Court recognized the right to 
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 76 The majority noted, "We 
are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic 
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamen-
. tal to the very existence and survival of the race."77 In the 
years since Skinner, the Court has expanded its assertion of the 
constitutional status of the right to procreate, finding it 
73. [d. at 1264; [quoting Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 542 (1986)]. 
74. 410 U.S. at 152. 
75. Otherwise known as the right to bear or beget children. 
76. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner the Court held unconstitutional a statute 
that permitted the sterilization of criminals who were three times convicted of certain 
crimes. Id. at 538. 
77. [d. at 541. 
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protected by both the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.78 
The right to privacy within marriage was recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.79 In Griswold, the 
Court struck down a statute that prohibited the use of con-
traceptives because it violated the right of marital privacy.8o 
This right to privacy was then expanded to include unmarried 
persons.8l 
Following this line of cases, an infertile couple can assert 
that to prohibit their access to IVF through egg donation by tak-
ing away the resulting child is to interfere with the right to pri-
vacy within marriage. If the recipient couple has an infertility 
problem, the decision to resort to IVF is essentially a decision 
to "bear or beget a child. "82 Prohibiting the use of IVF effec-
tively denies an infertile couple the right to procreate. It is not 
a question of "how," but "whether" to bear a child if such 
means is the only way to conceive a child. 
B. CASE LAW CONSIDERATIONS 
The second line of argument for the recipient couple is 
based on the cases involving surrogacy, artificial insemination, 
and gestational surrogacy. Although the facts and decisions 
analyzed in Sections 111-V of this article are distinguishable 
from each other, one thing remains clear: the courts' willing-
ness to grant custody of the child to the recipient couple. This 
78. One example is Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
The Supreme Court voided a school district rule that required pregnant teachers to 
take maternity leave during the last five months of pregnancy, holding that such a rule, 
"can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of personal choice in matters of mar-
riage and family life protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." [d. at 639. 
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
80. The Court, in rendering its decision, reasoned, "[t]he present case, then, con-
cerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several constitution-
al guarantees. And concerns law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives 
rather than regulating their manufacture and sale, seeks to achieve its goals by 
means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship .... The very idea 
is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." [d. at 
485-86. 
81. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court concluded that, "[i]fthe 
right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." [d. at 453. 
82. [d. 
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is shown in the cases of Matter of Baby M.,83 Adoption of 
Matthew B.,SJo Anna J. v. Mark C.,8li and Jhordan C. v. Mary K88 
It seems the courts hold tantamount protecting the best 
interests of the child. These interests are best served by the 
recipient couple; who has planned for the raising of the child 
from the beginning; who has undergone the nine months of 
pregnancy together; and who has "bonded" with the child. 
The courts find these considerations should not be overridden 
by the fact that the donor has a genetic tie with the child. 
Further, the California courts are seemingly willing to uphold 
these arrangements as a valid contract.87 
C. LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
In the context of IVF egg donation, California Civil Code 
Section 700388 should be read in conjunction with Section 
700589 in order to establish the parent and child relationship 
with respect to the natural mother. The fact that Section 
7005 expressly relinquishes the parental rights of a sperm 
donor should be a major factor in the court's determination of 
whether or not to relinquish the parental rights of an egg 
donor. If a sperm donor has no legal right or obligation to an 
offspring produced by his donated sperm, there is no logical rea-
son that the same should not hold true for an egg donor. It 
seems absurd that there would be legislation protecting a cou-
ple using artificial insemination against a claim by the donor 
while not having any such legislation protecting a couple 
using IVF egg donation from a claim by an egg donor. The 
California legislature may avoid custody battles in this area by 
following the lead of other states.90 But until then, a court 
should read California Civil Code Sections 7003 and 7005 
83. 537 A.2d at 1227. 
84. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1239. 
85. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 12433. 
86. 179 Cal. App. 3d at 386. 
87. See Matthew B. and Anna J. supra notes 11, 13. 
88. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 12435. 
89. CAL. CIV. CODE SECTION 7005 (West 1988). See supra note 52. 
90. One state that has passed legislation dealing explicitly with egg/oocyte 
donation is Oklahoma. Oklahoma Statute Section 554 states, "[a]ny child or children 
born as a result of a heterologous oocyte donation shall be considered for all intent and 
purposes, the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and 
wife which consent to and receive an oocyte pursuant to the use of the technique ofhet-
erologous oocyte donation." Oklahoma Statute Section 555 states, "[a] n oocyte donor 
shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to a child born as a result of a 
heterologous oocyte donation from such donor." 10 Okl. St. 554, 555 (1990). 
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together, in order to see the compelling interests of the recip-
ient couple that must be served. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While there is no modern treatment for infertility, a couple 
wanting to have a child has many choices. One of those 
choices, IVF through egg donation, allows the husband to be 
genetically related to the child, and the wife to experience 
gestation and the birth of the resulting child. Is the potential 
disappointment experienced by the donor a sufficient basis for 
courts to override allocation of rearing rights and duties in the 
offspring? To do so would shift the emphasis to the welfare of 
the donor, away from the welfare of the offspring or the recip-
ient couple. At the present and in the absence of legislative 
guidance, the court fortunately seems unwilling to make that 
shift. 
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